Observational constraints on the equilibrium climate sensitivity have been generated in a variety of ways, but the epistemic basis of these calculations have not always been clearly presented and a number of results have been calculated which appear to be based on somewhat informal heuristics. This causes a lack of clarity about the status of such results and how they compare 5 to other analyses, in particular whether the differences between them may be due to differences in unstated assumptions rather than observational evidence.
confidence intervals are not the same thing as Bayesian credible intervals. The latter interpretation for an interval refers to a degree of belief that the particular interval that has been generated on a specific occasion does in fact include the parameter.
Climate scientists are far from unique in this misinterpretation, which appears to be widespread throughout the scientific community (Hoekstra et al., 2014) . Because this misunderstanding is so deeply embedded in scientific practice and discourse, we now discuss and explain it in some detail.
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We start by noting that probabilistic statements concerning the true value x T demand the use of the Bayesian paradigm, wherein the language and mathematics of probability may be applied to events that are not intrinsically random, but about which our knowledge is uncertain (Bernardo and Smith, 1994) . The parameter x T here does not itself have a probability distribution; it was assumed to take a fixed value. Therefore to even talk of "the pdf of x T " in this manner is to commit a category error. It is the researcher's beliefs concerning x T that are uncertain, and this uncertainty is represented as their pdf for
Bayes' Theorem is a simple consequence of the axioms of probability: the joint density p(x o , x T ) of two variables x o and x T can be decomposed in two different ways via
and thus
p(x T |x o ) is our posterior density for the true value x T given the observational evidence .
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When the terms for x o and σ are replaced in this function by their known numerical values, this function looks like it could be a probability distribution for p(x T |x o ), but as Bayes' Theorem (Equation 2) makes clear, it is not in general the posterior pdf, instead being merely one term in its calculation. This is the critical point which underpins the analyses presented in this paper:
the sampling distribution of the observation defined by measurement models such as Equation 1 directly defines the likelihood p(x o |x T ) and not the posterior pdf p(x T |x o ).
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The error in the syllogism is to interpret p(x o |x T ) as p(x T |x o ): this is a common fallacy known as the "confusion of the inverse" which is closely related to the "prosecutor's fallacy", the latter term generally being used in discrete probability where the phenomenon is more widely known and well studied. The fallacy is perhaps easiest to illustrate with discrete cases which compare P (A|B) to P (B|A) for a pair of events A and B. For example, the probability of a person suffering from a rare disease (event A), given that they tested positive for it (event B), is in general different from (and often rather lower than than) 30 the probability that someone produces a positive test result, given that they are suffering from the disease. It has been known for some time that medical doctors routinely commit this transposition error (Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995) . Additional examples and discussion in relation to interval estimation can be found in Morey et al. (2016) .
We now present a simple example in which the syllogism leads to poor results in a physically-based scenario with continuous data. We take as given that the timing error of a hand-held stopwatch is ±0.25s at one standard deviation (Hetzler et al., 2008) .
That is to say, the measured time t o is related to the true time, t T , via t o = t T + with ∼ N (0.0.25) (cf Equation 1). Let us consider an experiment in which an adult male colleague holds a dense object (say, a stone) at head height while standing, and drops it while the experimenter times how long it takes for the stone to reach the ground.
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An observed time of t o = 0.60s could lead someone to say via the confusion of the inverse fallacy that the true time taken is represented by the Gaussian pdf t T ∼ N (0.6, 0.25) (albeit with an assumed truncation at zero which we ignore for convenience). One implication of this pdf is that there is a 16% chance that the true time is less than 0.35s, and also a 16% chance that it is more than 0.85s. Ignoring the negligible air resistance and using the simple equation of motion under gravity h = 1 2 at 2 , one would have no choice but to conclude from these values that the experimenter's colleague has a 16% chance of being less 10 than 60cm tall, and also a 16% chance of being greater than 4.5m tall. For a typical adult male, neither of these cases seems reasonable. We have obtained a measurement which is entirely unremarkable, with the observed time corresponding to a fall of around 1.75m. And yet the commonplace interpretation of an imprecise measurement as directly giving rise to a probability distribution for the measurand has lead to palpably ridiculous results. While in many cases the results will not be so silly, this simple example does demonstrate that the methodology cannot be sound. More pernicious cases are where the interpretation
15
is not so obviously silly and thus may be confidently presented, even though the methodology is still (as we have just shown) invalid.
In order to make sensible use of this observation, we can instead perform a simple Bayesian updating procedure. The distribution N (0.6, 0.25) is actually correctly interpreted as the likelihood of the observed time p(t o |t T ), which can be used to update a prior estimate. The distribution of adult male heights in the UK (in metres) is taken to be by N (1.75, 0.07) and
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we use this as our prior. The drop time t predicted from a height drop h is given by t = 2h/a where a = 9.8ms −2 is the acceleration due to gravity. Due to the substantial observational uncertainty, the likelihood of the drop time is virtually flat across the support of the prior, varying by less than 1% across the range of 1.60m to 1.90m. The posterior estimate obtained through Bayes' Theorem is easily calculated by direct numerical integration and still approximates to N (1.75, 0.07) to two decimal places. The correct interpretation of the experiment is not, therefore, that the measurement shows there is a substantial 25 probability of the researcher breaking a height record, but rather that the measurement is so imprecise that it does not add any significant information on top of what was already known.
While it is formally invalid, we must acknowledge that this syllogism does actually work rather well in many cases. In particular, if the likelihood p(x o |x T ) is non-negligible over a sufficiently small neighbourhood of x o such that a prior can reasonably be used which is close to uniform in this region of x o , then the true posterior calculated by a Bayesian analysis will 30 be close to that asserted by the syllogism. For example, if the Gaussian prior x T ∼ N (100, 20) were to be used in the original example, then when this is updated by the likelihood corresponding to the observation x o = 74.6 with uncertainty σ = 0.25, the correct posterior p(x T |x o ) is actually given by N (74.6, 0.25) to several significant digits. In the limiting case where an unbounded uniform prior is used for x T , the syllogism is precisely correct. (Morey et al., 2016) . As well as concerns over the prior, it is also essential when taking this shortcut that the observational uncertainty σ is taken to be a constant which does not vary with the parameter of interest x T . This may be the case when we consider uncertainties arising solely from an observational instrument, but is less clear when σ includes a contribution from the system under study. For example, if the uncertainty in an observed estimate of the forced temperature response in an analysis of 10 climate change includes a contribution due to the internal variability of the climate system, then this internal variability could be expected to vary with the parameters of the system. In this case, the confusion of the inverse cannot be rescued by invocation of a uniform prior. However we do not explore this uncertainty in σ further in this paper.
Some have attempted to retrospectively defend the use of this syllogism with the claim that the uniform prior is necessarily the correct one to use, generally via the belief that this represents some sort of pure or maximal state of ignorance. How-15 ever, it is well-established (and indeed is sometimes used as a specific point of criticism) that there is no such thing as pure ignorance within the Bayesian framework. See Annan and Hargreaves (2011) for further discussion of this in the context of climate science. As Morey et al. (2016) states: "Using confidence intervals as if they were credible intervals is an attempt to smuggle Bayesian meaning into frequentist statistics, without proper consideration of a prior." There is also a strand of Bayesianism which asserts more broadly that in any given experimental context there is a single preferred prior, typically one 20 which maximises the influence of the likelihood in some well-defined manner. Jeffreys Prior is one common approach within this "objective Bayesian" framework. However, it has the disadvantage that it assigns zero probability to events that the observations are uninformative about. This 'see no evil' approach does have mathematical benefits but it is hard to accept as a robust method if the results of the analysis are intended to be of practical use. In the real world, our inability to (currently) observe something cannot rationally be considered sufficient reason to rule it out. We do not consider "objective Bayesian" approaches 25 further.
Priors for the climate sensitivity
Most probabilistic estimates of the equilibrium climate sensitivity which have explicitly presented a Bayesian framework, have used a prior which is uniform in sensitivity S. There does not appear to be any principled basis for this choice, which has been argued on the basis that it represented 'ignorance'. One could just as easily (and erroneously) argue that a prior which 30 is uniform in feedback λ = F 2× /S was ignorant (here F 2× is the forcing arising from a doubling of CO 2 ). In fact both of these improper priors can exhibit a pathology which causes problems with their use. In particular, if the likelihood is non-zero at λ = 0 (respectively, S = 0), then when the improper unbounded uniform prior on S (λ) is used, the posterior will also be improper and unbounded. In practical applications, this problem has generally been masked by the use of an upper bound on the prior, but (while a lower bound of 0 may be defended on the basis of stability) the choice of upper bound is hard to justify.
The upper bound which appears to have been most commonly used for sensitivity is 10
• C and we will adopt this choice here.
We use a range of 0.37 -10 for the uniform priors in both λ and S, which ensures that their ranges are numerically identical (although their units are of course different). As a third alternative prior for S, we will also use the positive half of a Cauchy prior, with location 0 and scale parameter 5, ie p(S) = 2 5π(1+(S/5) 2 ) , S > 0. An attractive feature of the Cauchy prior is that 5 it has a long tail which only decreases quadratically (hence it does not rule out high vales a priori) and moreover, its inverse is also Cauchy so both S and λ have broad support. The scale factor is the 50th percentile of the distribution hence the halfCauchy prior for S has a 50% probability of exceeding 5
• C. The scale factor of the corresponding implied prior in λ is given by 3.7/5 = 0.74m
.
Applications

10
We now consider three areas in which observational constraints have been used to estimate the equilibrium climate sensitivity.
Firstly, we consider paleoclimatic evidence, which relates to intervals during which the climate was reasonably stable over a long period of time and significantly different to the pre-industrial state. We then consider analyses of the observations of the warming trend over the 20th Century (strictly, extending into the 21st and 19th century). Finally we consider analyses of interannual variability. 
Observationally-derived PDFs
A common paradigm for estimating the equilibrium climate sensitivity S using paleoclimatic data is to consider an interval in which the climate was reasonably stable and significantly different to the present, and analyse proxy data such as pollen grains and isotopic ratios in sediment cores in order generate estimates of the global mean temperature anomaly ∆T and forcing
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anomaly ∆F relative to the current (pre-industrial) climate. S can then be estimated via the equation
where F 2× is the forcing due to a doubling of the atmospheric CO 2 concentration. Examples of this approach include Annan and Hargreaves (2006) and Rohling et al. (2012) .
The interval which has been examined in most detail in this manner is probably the Last Glacial Maximum, 19-23ka (Mix 25 et al., 2001) where the climate was reasonably stable (at least in the sense of gross evaluations such as global mean surface air temperature on millennial time scales) and substantially different to the present day such that the signal to noise ratio in estimates of forcing and temperature change are reasonably high.
The method adopted by Annan and Hargreaves (2006) and we believe many others (although this is not always documented explicitly), which we term here 'sampling the observational pdfs', was to generate an ensemble of values of S by repeatedly .
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In the illustrative calculations presented here we ignore any issues relating to the non constancy of the sensitivity S and how it might vary in relation to the background climate state and nature of the forcing, although we have slightly inflated the uncertainties of the observational constraints in order to make some attempt to compensate for this. Thus the numerical values generated here are not intended to be definitive but are still adequate to illustrate the different approaches.
Although they may not have been clearly presented as such, most published estimates for ∆T should be correctly understood 10 as representing likelihoods p(∆T o |∆T T ) -that is to say, the observational analysis provides an uncertain estimate of the true value of the form given by Equation 1 with an a priori unbiased error of the specified value. This follows immediately from a description of the observational evidence, which is typically based on analyses of data from proxies which is calibrated so as to represent temperature estimates with reasonably well-characterised uncertainties. The result of Annan and Hargreaves (2013) certainly fits this description. Adopting such a likelihood as a pdf for the true temperature anomaly is therefore a clear example
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of the confusion of the inverse fallacy.
For the forcing estimate, things are not so clear. We do not have direct proxy-based evidence for the forcing, which is typically estimated based on a combination of modelling results and some rather subjective judgements (Köhler et al., 2010; Rohling et al., 2012) . Any uncertainty in the actual measurements involved, such as those of greenhouse gas concentrations in bubbles in ice cores, makes a negligible contribution to the overall uncertainty in total forcing. Therefore, we do not have a clear 20 measurement model of the form given in Equation 1 with which to define a likelihood for the forcing. Thus we consider the stated distribution to directly represent a prior estimate for the forcing anomaly. We do not claim that this is the only reasonable approach to take here and other researchers might prefer to make different choices, in particular if they could clearly identify a likelihood arising from observational data.
When applied to the numerical estimates provided above, the pdf-sampling method of Annan and Hargreaves (2006) gener-
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ates an ensemble for S with a median estimate of 2.1
• C and a 5-95% range of 1.0 to 3.8
• C. Figure 1 presents this result as the cyan line, together with additional results which will be described below.
Bayesian interpretation and alternative priors
Now we present alternative calculations which take a more standard explicitly Bayesian approach. We start by writing the model in the form
or equivalently
where λ = S/3.7 is the feedback parameter. This formulation allows us to easily consider the forcing and feedback parameter as uncertain inputs to the model, which can then be updated by the likelihood arising from the observed temperature change.
Although the method of sampling observational pdfs described in Section 3.1.1 was not presented in Bayesian terms, we are now in a position to present a Bayesian interpretation of it. The distribution generated by sampling the pdfs is distributed as independently Gaussian N (5, 1.5) in ∆T and Gaussian N (9, 2) in ∆F . We aim to generate this as the posterior of our Bayesian 5 analysis. The likelihood for ∆T as described above is taken to be the Gaussian N (5, 1.5) and therefore (by rearrangement of Bayes' Theorem) the prior must be uniform in ∆T and independently Gaussian N (9, 2) in ∆F . For numerical reasons we must impose bounds on the uniform prior for ∆T and set this range to be 0-20
Using Equation 3, we can reparameterise this joint prior distribution over ∆T and ∆F into S and ∆F , and this is presented in Figure 2 . Note that this prior cannot be represented as the product of independent distributions over S and ∆F , as high S
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here is correlated with low ∆F and vice versa. The prior in S when viewed as a marginal distribution (i.e., after integrating
over ∆F ) appears uniform over a significant range (roughly between S = 0.6 and S = 5) but within this range it is associated with somewhat high values for ∆F , with the latter taking a mean value of about 9.5W m −2 over this region. The details of the shape of this joint prior does depend on the bounds placed on the uniform prior for ∆T , but this does not affect the posterior so long as the prior is broad enough to cover the neighbourhood of the observation. We think it is unlikely that researchers 15 would choose a joint prior of this form deliberately, and confirm that this certainly was not the case in Annan and Hargreaves (2006) . In future analyses it would seem more appropriate to clearly state the priors which are used, and test the sensitivity of the results to this choice.
In order to perform a more conventional Bayesian updating procedure using Equation 5, we must first select priors on the model inputs. For the forcing ∆F , we retain the N (9, 2) prior, having no plausible basis for trying anything different. For 20 sensitivity, we test the three priors described in Section 2.2. The two uniform priors generate rather different results. Using a prior which is uniform in S the posterior has a mean value for S of 2.2
• C and a 5-95% range of 1.0-4.2
• C. When we change to uniform in λ the median decreases to 1.5
• C with a 5-95% range of 0.5-3.0
• C. While these results, which are shown in Figure 1 , overlap substantially, broadening the upper bounds on the priors would result in the first result increasing without limit and the second decreasing towards zero such that they would fully separate. We therefore see that extreme choices for the prior on S
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(or λ) can have significant influence on Bayesian estimation, which is perhaps not surprising given the large uncertainties in the observational constraints used here. The median posterior value for S obtained from the half-Cauchy prior is 2.1
• C with a 5-95% range of 1.0-3.8
• C, which coincidentally aligns very closely with the result obtained by the naive method of sampling observational pdfs (which is plotted as a thick line in Figure 1 in order to make it more visible). We conclude in this case that the method of sampling pdfs has generated a result which is reasonable but alternative choices of prior could give noticeably 3.2 Estimates based on historical warming
Observationally-derived PDFs
Perhaps the most common approach to estimating S has been to use the instrumental record (Tol and De Vos, 1998; Gregory et al., 2002; Olson et al., 2012; Aldrin et al., 2012) . While a wide range of climate models have been utilised for this purpose, a simple energy balance similar to that of Section 3.1 can be used so long as the radiative imbalance is accounted for. We follow where ∆Q represents the net planetary radiative imbalance and the other terms are as before. This equation is applied between two widely separated decadal-scale intervals within the historical record, such that the signal to noise ratio (and hence precision in the resulting estimate of S) is as large as possible, though it remains a significant source of uncertainty .
Similar to Section 3.1.1, the method used by Mauritsen and Pincus (2017) is one of sampling observationally-derived pdfs for all uncertain quantities on the right hand side of equation 6, and thereby generating an ensemble of values for S which was 5 interpreted as a probability distribution.
Bayesian interpretation and alternative priors
Reorganising the equation in order to give ∆T as the prognostic variable we obtain
As before, we adopt the distributions used by Mauritsen and Pincus (2017) for ∆F and ∆Q as priors for these variables, . Given the similarities between Equations 3 and 6, and also in the method used, it is no surprise to find that the implicit prior used here before updating with the temperature likelihood is qualitatively similar to that found in Section 3.1.
This is shown in Figure 3 . Again the marginal prior over S appears uniform over a reasonable range (the details depend on the limits of the uniform prior over ∆T ) but nevertheless it is actually correlated with the net forcing. Figure 4 shows the posterior 15 result arising from this prior, which matches the published result of Mauritsen and Pincus (2017) closely despite our minor simplification to their calculation. The posterior median calculated here is 1.8
• C with a 5-95% range of 1.1-4.5
• C. As in Section 3.1, we make no attempt to decompose the forcing estimate into prior and likelihood, especially as some of the largest uncertainties (e.g. that arising from aerosol forcing) are based on modelling calculations and expert judgments that cannot be transparently traced to uncertainties in observational data. Thus again the half-Cauchy prior produces a result which is intermediate between the other explicit choices, though this time it has a somewhat longer tail than the pdf sampling method. The differences between these results, especially for the upper 95% 25 limit, are substantial and could significantly alter their interpretation and impact.
Estimates based on interannual variability
Observationally-derived PDFs
Finally, we consider a method which has been used to estimate the climate sensitivity via interannual variation in radiation balance and temperature (Forster and Gregory, 2006; Dessler and Forster, 2018) . The basic premise of these analyses is that the observations) against temperature anomalies, with data typically averaged on an annual time scale (though seasonal data may also be used). There are questions as to whether this short-term variability provides an accurate estimate of long-term changes, but this is beyond the scope of this manuscript (Dessler and Forster, 2018) . The regression slope and its uncertainty naturally translates into a Gaussian likelihood for the true feedback component, and has been commonly interpreted as a probability distribution for λ. While this again appears to commit the fallacy of confusion of the inverse, the implicit assumption of a 5 uniform prior on λ has been clearly acknowledged by authors working in this area (e.g. see comments in Forster and Gregory (2006) and Forster (2016) ). In this section we will use the observational estimate of Forster and Gregory (2006) which is given by λ o = 2.3 ± 0.7W K 
Bayesian interpretation and alternative priors
As noted by Forster and Gregory (2006) , presenting what actually amounts to an observational likelihood for λ as a posterior pdf is equivalent to assuming a uniform prior in λ. Therefore the Bayesian interpretation is already clear in this instance.
In Figure 5 we present the results of calculations using our three alternative priors (albeit one of them coincides with the method of sampling pdfs). The original result of Forster and Gregory (2006) (after transforming to S-space) is represented 5 by the blue lines, with red showing the result obtained for a uniform prior in S and magenta being a Cauchy prior. We note that, for the uniform-S case, if the upper bound on the prior was raised, the posterior would also increase without limit due to the pathological behaviour discussed in Section 3.1.2 and also by Annan and Hargreaves (2011) . For the priors shown (with the uniform priors defined as U [0.37, 10]) the 5-95% ranges of the posteriors are 1.1-3.2
• C, 1.2-6.9
• C and 1.2-5.2
• C for the uniform-λ, uniform-S and Cauchy-S priors respectively. The uniform-λ prior commonly adopted by analyses of this 10 type provides a strong tendency towards low values and the the contrast with uniform-S, especially for the upper bound, is disconcerting.
Conclusions
We have shown how various calculations which have presented probabilistic estimates of the equilibrium climate sensitivity S can be reinterpreted within a standard Bayesian framework. Using this standard framework ensures a clear distinction between 15 the prior choices which must be made for model parameters and inputs, and the likelihood obtained from observations of the system which is then used to update this prior in order to generate the posterior.
In many cases, the implied prior for S which underlies the published results appears somewhat unnatural, having either a structural relationship with model inputs or a marginal distribution that may not be considered reasonable. We have presented alternative calculations in which a range of simple priors are tested. As well as the commonly-used uniform priors, we have
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shown that a Cauchy prior has some attractive features, in that it extend to high values (refuting any suspicion that the results obtained were simply constrained by the prior), its reciprocal is also Cauchy (so both S and λ may have long tails). The halfCauchy distribution used in this paper only requires a single scale parameter which determines the width. However the choice of priors is always subjective and we make no assertion that this choice should be universally adopted. Indeed there may be superior alternative choices that we have not considered.
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Our calculations suggest that the pdf sampling method can generate acceptable results in some cases, agreeing fairly well with a fully Bayesian approach using reasonable priors. However, this is not always the case. We recommend that researchers should present their analysis in an explicitly Bayesian manner as we have done here, as this allows the influence of the prior and other uncertain inputs to be transparently tested.
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